One still comes across references in the mainstream media to Russian “expansionism” and “the Soviet empire”, in addition to that old favorite “the evil empire”. These terms stem largely from erstwhile Soviet control of Eastern European states. But was the creation of these satellites following World War II an act of imperialism or expansionism? Or did the decisive impetus lie elsewhere?
Within the space of less than 25 years, Western powers had invaded Russia three times – the two world wars and the “Intervention” of 1918-20 – inflicting some 40 million casualties in the two wars alone. To carry out these invasions, the West had used Eastern Europe as a highway. Should it be any cause for wonder that after World War II the Soviets wanted to close this highway down? In almost any other context, Americans would have no problem in seeing this as an act of self-defense. But in the context of the Cold War such thinking could not find a home in mainstream discourse.
[adrotate banner=”56″]The Baltic states of the Soviet Union – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – were not part of the highway and were frequently in the news because of their demands for more autonomy from Moscow, a story “natural” for the American media. These articles invariably reminded the reader that the “once independent” Baltic states were invaded in 1939 by the Soviet Union, incorporated as republics of the USSR, and had been “occupied” ever since. Another case of brutal Russian imperialism. Period. History etched in stone.
The three countries, it happens, were part of the Russian empire from 1721 up to the Russian Revolution of 1917, in the midst of World War I. When the war ended in November 1918, and the Germans had been defeated, the victorious Allied nations (US, Great Britain, France, et al.) permitted/encouraged the German forces to remain in the Baltics for a full year to crush the spread of Bolshevism there; this, with ample military assistance from the Allied nations. In each of the three republics, the Germans installed collaborators in power who declared their independence from the new Bolshevik state which, by this time, was so devastated by the World War, the revolution, and the civil war prolonged by the Allies’ intervention, that it had no choice but to accept the fait accompli. The rest of the fledgling Soviet Union had to be saved.
To at least win some propaganda points from this unfortunate state of affairs, the Soviets announced that they were relinquishing the Baltic republics “voluntarily” in line with their principles of anti-imperialism and self-determination. But it should not be surprising that the Soviets continued to regard the Baltics as a rightful part of their nation or that they waited until they were powerful enough to reclaim the territory.
Then we had Afghanistan. Surely this was an imperialist grab. But the Soviet Union had lived next door to Afghanistan for more than 60 years without gobbling it up. And when the Russians invaded in 1979, the key motivation was the United States involvement in a movement, largely Islamic, to topple the Afghan government, which was friendly to Moscow. The Soviets could not have been expected to tolerate a pro-US, anti-communist government on its border any more than the United States could have been expected to tolerate a pro-Soviet, communist government in Mexico.
Moreover, if the rebel movement took power it likely would have set up a fundamentalist Islamic government, which would have been in a position to proselytize the numerous Muslims in the Soviet border republics.
Although the improved relations between the two superpowers resulted in a strategic U-turn, the United States continued to defend their zones of influence throughout the world. Through the Camp David Agreements of 17 September 1978, which provided for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, US President Jimmy Carter was able to bring Egypt back into the American fold.
Meanwhile, the USSR was benefiting from the decolonisation process and gaining its own new spheres of influence. Since the time of James Monroe, President of the United States from 1817 to 1825, the Central American country of Nicaragua had been a zone of American influence. The Sandinista Liberation Front took advantage of President Carter’s lack of interest in Nicaragua to overthrow the dictator Anastasio Somoza. Very rapidly, Cuba and the USSR became the Sandinista regime’s new allies.
The USSR also profited from the settlement of the Vietnam conflict in 1975 to gain a foothold in Africa, particularly in Guinea, Mozambique and Angola. The fall of the Ethiopian imperial regime of Haile Selassie in September 1974 and the immediate establishment of a Communist dictatorship in the oldest African state only emphasised the Soviet hold over Africa, at China’s expense. Initially, the United States’ response to the Soviet advance in a series of Socialist-oriented states was restrained and sporadic. For example, the United States supported the anti-Communist guerrillas in Angola.
However, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet army on 24 December 1979 provoked a much more vigorous reaction from the Western world. The USSR was seeking to support the ruling Communists against increasingly threatening counter-revolutionary guerrillas. President Carter ordered a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow and an embargo on grain exports to the USSR. The UN adopted a resolution condemning this military invasion. The United States’ response did not stop at diplomatic condemnation. During the ten years of the conflict, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) offered assistance and financial support to the Afghan resistance, or Mujahideen.