Idealista Francisco Suarez Bibliography

The Metaphysicist


The central problem in metaphysics, as seen by the Information Philosopher, is the existential or ontological status of ideas. The creation of new ideas requires the existence of ontological chance, which must therefore be a fundamental aspect of metaphysical reality. Metaphysics is an abstract human invention about the nature of concrete reality – immaterial thoughts about material things. Information philosophy explains the metaphysics of chance and possibilities, which always underlie the creation of new information. Without metaphysical possibilities, there can be no human creativity and no new knowledge. Without the existence of possibilities, there is no possibility for metaphysics itself. The Metaphysicist analyzes the information content in some classic problems in metaphysics – Abstract Entities, Being and Becoming, Causality, Chance, Change, Coinciding Objects, Composition (Parts and Wholes), Constitution, Essentialism, Free Will or Determinism, God and Immortality, Identity, Individuation, Mind-Body Problem, Modality, Necessity or Contingency, Persistence, Possibility and Actuality, Space and Time, Universals, Vagueness, and the 20th-century problem of Wave-Particle Duality. All these problems are accessible from the drop-down menu above – Metaphysical Problems. The Metaphysicist also includes pages on some classic puzzles and paradoxes that are used to wrestle with metaphysical problems – The Debtor's Paradox, Dion and Theon, Frege's Puzzle, The Growing Argument, The Infinite Regress, The Problem of the Many, The Ship of Theseus, The Sorites Puzzle, The Statue and the Clay, and Tibbles, the Cat.
The Metaphysicist's Basic Library

A materialist metaphysics asks questions about the underlying substrate presumed to constitute all the objects in the universe. Unfortunately, most modern philosophers are determinists who think that the material substrate is all there is. As Jaegwon Kim puts it,
"bits of matter and their aggregates in space-time exhaust the contents of the world. This means that one would be embracing an ontology that posits entities other than material substances — that is, immaterial minds, or souls, outside physical space, with immaterial, nonphysical properties."
A formalist or idealist metaphysics asks about the arrangement and organization of matter that shapes material objects, what brings their forms into existence, and what causes their changes in space and time. Information philosophy defends a Platonic realm of immaterial ideas in a dualism with the realm of matter. The information realm is physical and natural. It is not supernatural and "outside space and time." Ideas are embodied in matter and use energy for their communication. But they are neither matter nor energy. They are forms that inform. The total amount of matter (and energy) in the universe is a conserved quantity. Because of the universe expansion, there is ever more room in space for each material particle, ever more ways to arrange the material, ever more possibilities. The total information in the universe is constantly increasing. This is the first contribution of information philosophy to metaphysics. The second contribution is to restore a dualist idealism, based on the essential importance of information communication in all living things. Since the earliest forms of proto-life, information stored in each organism has been used to create the following generations, including the variations that have evolved to become thinking human beings who invented the world of ideas that contains metaphysics. Abstract information is an essential, if immaterial, part of reality. Plato was right that his "ideas" (ἰδέας) are real. The forms inform. A third contribution from information philosophy adds biology to the analysis of metaphysical problems which began in puzzles over change and growth. The parts of living things – we call them biomers – are communicating with one another, which integrates them into their "wholes" in a way impossible for mere material parts – a biomereological essentialism.
The arrangement of individual material particles and their interaction is abstract immaterialinformation. The metaphysics of information can explain the cosmic creation process underlying the origin of all information structures in the universe and the communication of information between all living things, which we will show use a meaningful biological language, consisting of arbitrary symbols, that has evolved to become human language. Ontology asks the question "what is there?" Eliminative materialism claims that nothing exists but material particles, which makes many problems in ancient and modern metaphysics difficult if not insoluble. To be sure, we are made of the same material as the ancient metaphysicians. With every breath we take, we inspire 10 or 20 of the fixed number of molecules of air that sustained Aristotle. We can calculate this because the material in the universe is a constant. But information is not a fixed quantity. The stuff of thought and creativity, information has been increasing since the beginning of the universe. There is ever more knowledge, but relatively little increase in wisdom? With hundreds if not thousands of times as many philosophers as ancient Greece, can we still be debating the same ancient puzzles and paradoxes? Information philosophy restores so-called "non-existent objects" to our ontology. Abstract entities consist of the same kind of information that provides the structure and process information of a concrete object. What we call a "concept" about an object is some subset of the immaterial information in the object, accurate to the extent that the concept is isomorphic to that subset. Epistemology asks the question, "how do we know what there is?" Immaterial information provides a new ground for epistemology, the theory of knowledge. We know something about the "things themselves" when we discover an isomorphism between our abstract ideas and concrete objects in the material world. Information philosophy goes beyond the logical puzzles and language games of analytic philosophy. It identifies knowledge as information in human minds and in the external artifacts of human culture. Abstract information is the foundation – the metaphysical ground – of both logic and language as means of communication. It is a dual parallel to the material substrate that the Greeks called ὑποκείμενον - the "underlying." It gives matter its form and shape. Form informs. Much of formal metaphysics is about necessary relationships between universal ideas, certain knowledge that we can believe independent of any experience, knowledge that is "a priori" and "analytic" (true by logic and reason alone, or by definition). Some of these ideas appear to be unchanging, eternal truths in any possible world. Information philosophy now shows that there is no necessity in the natural world. Apodeictic certainty is just an idea. There is no a priori knowledge that was not first discovered empirically (a posteriori). Only after the fact did we see how to demonstrate it logically as a priori. And everything analytic is part of a humanly constructed language, and thus synthetic. All such "truths" are philosophical inventions, mere concepts, albeit some of the most powerful ideas ever to enter the universe. Most important, a formal and idealistic metaphysics is about abstract entities, in logic and mathematics, some of which seem to be true independent of time and space. Aristotle, the first metaphysician, called them "first principles" (archai, axioma). Gottfried Leibniz said they are true in all possible worlds. But if these abstract metaphysical truths are not material, where are these ideas in our world? Before their discovery, they subsisted as unknown properties. Once invented and discovered to be empirical facts, they are embedded in material objects, artifacts, and minds – the software in our hardware. Those ideas that are invented but not found empirically "real" (imagined fictions, flawed hypotheses) are also added to the sum of human knowledge. Many unchanging abstract entities share a property that the early philosophers Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle called "Being," to distinguish its nature from "Becoming," the property of all material objects that change with time. A certain truth cannot possibly change. It is unfortunate that information philosophy undermines the logical concepts of metaphysical necessity, certainty, the a priori and analytic, even truth itself, by limiting their analyticity to the unchanging abstract entities in the realm of Being. But, on the positive side, information philosophy now establishes the metaphysical possibility of ontological possibilities. Possibilities depend on the existence of irreducible ontological chance, the antithesis of necessity. Without metaphysical possibilities, no new information can be created. Information philosophy and metaphysics restore an immaterial mind to the impoverished and deflated metaphysics that we have had since empiricism and naturalism rejected the dualist philosophy of René Descartes and its troublesome mind-body problem. Naturalism is a Materialism. Just as Existentialism is a Humanism. Even stronger, naturalism is an eliminative materialism. It denies the immaterial and particularly the mental. While information philosophy is a form of the great idealism materialism dualism, it is not a substance dualism. Information is a physical, though immaterial, property of matter. Information philosophy is a property dualism. Abstract information is neither matter nor energy, although it needs matter for its embodiment and energy for its communication. Information is immaterial. It is the modern spirit, the ghost in the machine. It is the mind in the body. It is the soul. And when we die, our personal information and its communication perish. The matter remains. Information is the underlying currency of all communication and language. Passive material objects in the universe contain information, which metaphysicians and scientists analyze to understand everything material. But passive material objects do not create, actively communicate, and process information, as do all living things. Realism is the ontological commitment to the existence of material things. Information realism is equally committed to the existence or subsistence of immaterial, but physical, ideas. Human language is the most highly evolved form of information communication in biology. But even the simplest organisms signal their condition and their needs, both internally among their smallest parts and externally as they compete with other living things in their environment. Biosemioticians convincingly argue that all the messages in biology, from the intracellular genetic codes sent to the ribosomes to produce more of a specific protein, to the words in sentences like this one, are a meaningful part of one continuously evolving semantic system. All messaging is as purposeful as a human request for food, so biology is called teleonomic, though not teleological. This "telos" or purpose in life did not pre-exist life. Like human language, the signs used in biological messages can be symbolic and arbitrary, having no iconic or indexical or any other intrinsic relation between a signifier and the signified concept or object. Like human signs, the meaning of a biological sign is highly dependent on the context. Only four neurotransmitters act as primary messengers sent to a cell, inside of which one of dozens of secondary messengers may be activated to determine the use inside the particular cell - the ultimate Wittgensteinian "meaning as use" in the message. Modern anglo-american metaphysicians think problems in metaphysics can be treated as problems in language, potentially solved by conceptual analysis. They are analytical language philosophers. But language is too flexible, too ambiguous and full of metaphor, to be a diagnostic tool for metaphysics. We must go beyond language games and logical puzzles to the underlying information contained in a concept or object Information philosophy restores the metaphysical existence of a realm that is "beyond the natural" in the sense since at least David Hume and Immanuel Kant that the "laws of Nature" completely determine everything that exists, everything that happens, everything that exists in the phenomenal and material world. Although the immaterial realm of information is not "supernatural" in any way, the creation of information throws considerable light on why so many humans, though few scientists, believe – correctly as it turns out – that there is a providential force in the universe. Martin Heidegger, the philosopher of "Being," called Friedrich Nietzsche the "last metaphysician." Nietzsche thought that everything in his "lebensphilosophie" was the creation of human beings. Indeed, when we are creative, what we create is new information. Did we humans "discover" the ideas, or did we "invent" them and then find them to be true of the world, including those true in any possible world? As opposed to an analytic language metaphysician, a metaphysicist searches for answers in the analysis of immaterial (but physical) information that can be seen when it is embodied in external material information structures. Otherwise it can only be known – in minds. Metaphysical truths are pure abstract information, internal to the realm of ideas . Metaphysical facts about the world are discovered when there are isomorphisms between abstract ideas and the concrete structures in the external world that embody those ideas. Information philosophy bridges the ideal and material worlds of Plato and Aristotle and the noumenal and phenomenal worlds of Kant. It demonstrates how immaterial minds are a causal force in the material world, connecting the psychological and phenomenological with the "things themselves," which are seen as embodiments of our ideas. The causal force of ideas, combined with the existence of alternative possibilities, is the information philosophy basis for human free will.

What are we to say about a field of human inquiry whose major problems have hardly changed over two millennia?

This website discusses a wide range of problems in metaphysics, situating each problem in its historical framework and providing accounts of the best work by today's metaphysicians. Metaphysicians today are generally analytic language philosophers who work on a surprisingly small number of metaphysical problems that began as puzzles and paradoxes over two thousand years ago. The Metaphysicist adds biological knowledge and quantum physics to help investigate the fundamental nature of reality. David Wiggins called for the former and E. Jonathan Lowe called for the latter. David Chalmers thinks information may help explain consciousness. An information-based metaphysics provides a single explanation for the origin and evolution of the universe and life on Earth. Since the beginning, it is the creation of material information structures that underlies all possibilities. From the first living thing, biological communication of information has played a causal role in evolution. Metaphysics must include both the study of matter and its immaterial form. A quantum particle is pure matter. The quantum wave function is pure abstract information about possibilities.
The metaphysics of possibility grounds the possibility of metaphysics.


Aristotle, Metaphysics, The Loeb Library, Harvard University Press.
Chalmers, D., Manley, D., & Wasserman, R. (2009). Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford University Press.
Chisholm, R. M.(1989) On Metaphysics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kant, Immanuel. (1977) Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Hackett
Long, A. A., & Sedley, D. N. (1989). The Hellenistic Philosophers: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography. Cambridge University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (1998) The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (2002) A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
Rea, M. C. ed. (2008) Metaphysics. 5 vols. New York: Routledge.
Rea, M. C. (2009). Arguing about metaphysics. New York, Routledge.
Sider, T., J. Hawthorne, and D. W. Zimmerman. (2008) Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Blackwell Publishing.
Taylor, R.. (1963) Metaphysics. Foundations of Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.
Van Inwagen, P. (2014) Metaphysics. Fourth Edition, Boulder: Westview Press.
Van Inwagen, P., and D. W. Zimmerman. (2008) Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 2nd Ed., Blackwell Publishing.
Wiggins, D.. (2002). Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Metaphysics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, by Peter Van Inwagen
Metaphysics on Wikipedia
Metaphysics on PhilPapers

Francisco Suárez on Metaphysics as the Science of Real Beings


References to the Latin edition of the Disputationes Metaphysicae (= DM) are to the edition in two volumes edited by Charles Berton reprinted in the Luis Vivés edition (voll. 25-26).

See the page Editions, Translations, Bibliographic Resources for complete bibliographical references and abstracts of the English translations.

"Suarez’s contributions are important in three areas in particular: philosophy, law, and theology. From a philosophical standpoint his most important works are: De anima, which contains much of his psychology, epistemology, and philosophy of mind; De gratia, which deals with issues of philosophical theology involving free will and determinism; and the monumental Disputationes metaphysicae. The last is undoubtedly one of the great works of Western philosophy. It is the first systematic and comprehensive treatise on metaphysics composed in the West that is not a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Furthermore, it summarizes and evaluates the metaphysical thought of fifteen hundred years of medieval and scholastic metaphysical speculation. Indeed, it is to this day the most complete and comprehensive exposition of scholastic and Aristotelian metaphysics. Its fifty-four disputations cover every metaphysical topic known during Suarez's time. De legibus is Suarez’s most important work dealing with legal and political theory. In it he explores in detail the nature of law and of civil society. Suarez’s views on international law (ius gentium) make him one of its founders. Suarez’s contributions in theology are contained in his numerous books on the subject. He touched upon almost every aspect of sacred doctrine, from the Trinity to questions pertaining to the spiritual life. This has made his theological writings a standard source of Catholic theology. Moreover, his role in helping to shape the response of the Catholic Counter-Reformation to the rise of Protestantism, guarantees a prominent place for his ideas in history. Suarez’s place in the history of philosophy is frequently disputed. Some authors place him firmly in the medieval tradition, claiming that he should be seen as perhaps the last world-class figure of that tradition before modem philosophy changes the philosophical direction of the West. Others see Suarez as providing the foundation for some of the views that were going to form the core of modem philosophy. Under the latter interpretation he is seen as a precursor of modem philosophy, rather than as the term of a medieval process of development."

From: Jorge J. E. Gracia, "Francisco Suárez: the Man in History", The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 1991, pp. 260-261 (notes omitted).

"Perhaps the most important enterprise of the Doctor eximius, the Disputationes metaphysicae is a complete résumé of his own and previous Scholastic thought on a myriad of questions, arranged in the form of fifty-four "Disputations" dealing with various topics systematically. (...)

In format, Suárez's Disputationes represented a radical departure from previous metaphysical treatises. Until its appearance, metaphysics had been explicitly treated either just incidentally in the form of Opuscula ("little works"), such as St. Thomas Aquinas's De ente et essentia ("On Being and Essence"), or in commentaries on the text of Aristotle. Both methods were clearly unsatisfactory, the one incomplete and the other shackled to the rambling obsolete order of Aristotle. So Suárez says that he intends to give, preparatory to theology, a complete exposition of metaphysics which, instead of following the text of Aristotle, will proceed in a systematic fashion.

In executing his intention, the Doctor eximius has divided his work into two main parts, to which correspond two tomes. After explaining in the first Disputation the object, the dignity, and the utility of metaphysics, he proceeds in the first part to treat of being in general, its properties and causes. In the second tome, he descends to items under being, considering them from a metaphysical viewpoint.

The first part studies the concept of being (Disputation 2) which, representing in some way everything that entails an order to existence, transcends all genera, species and differences. It will encompass everything real, from extrinsic denominations, through mere possibles, to the subsistent, purely actual, and necessary reality of God. Following this is a treatment of the essential properties of every being inasmuch as it is a being, namely, unity, truth and goodness. Under the discussion of unity, space is given to questions concerning the principle of individuation (Disputation 5), the reality of universal natures (Disputation 6), and the various kinds of distinction (Disputation 7). The discussion of truth (Disputation 8) is balanced by discussion of falsity (Disputation 9) and that of goodness (Disputation 10) by that of evil (Disputation 11) After the essential properties, there follows a consideration of the causes of being. Disputation 12 treats causes in general while Disputations 13-25 deal with various types of causes. Concluding this first part, Disputation 26 presents a comparison of causes with their effects and Disputation 27 considers the mutual relations of causes one to another.

The second part opens with the division of being into infinite and finite (Disputation 28). Infinite being, or God, is the subject of the next two Disputations. In Disputation 29, the existence and unicity of God is demonstrated metaphysically. Disputation 30 goes on to investigate, as far as unaided human reason can, the divine perfection, simplicity, immensity, immutability, wisdom, and omnipotence. With Disputation 31 Suárez begins his treatment of finite being. It is this Disputation which is the locus of the famed Suárezian denial of the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures. In Disputation 32, Suárez considers the distinction of substance and accident in general. Substance is treated in metaphysical detail through the next four Disputations while the different categories of accident are the subject matter of Disputations 37 to 53. The fifty-fourth Disputation, (...) concludes the whole work with a discussion of "beings of reason" including negations, privations, and reason-dependent relations -- all of which fall outside real being, the object of metaphysics."

From: John P. Doyle Introduction to: On Beings of Reason. (De Entibus Rationis). Metaphysical Disputation LIV. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1995, pp. 8-10 (notes omitted).

"It is generally agreed that modern philosophy places greater stress on the subjectivity of the knower than on the objective reality of the known, as does medieval philosophy. Suárez, when faced with a basic problem of metaphysics, whether the concept of ''being" is one or mul­tiple, decided, without any Scholastic precedent, to make a subjective state of mind ( conceptus formalis entis) the criterion for establishing the unitary sense of objective reality ( conceptus obiectivus entis). When problems like that of "being" became too difficult to resolve by the usual medieval objective" approach, Suárez recommended recourse to the "subjective" because it was better known ( notior) to us than the objec­tive, especially as the subjective is produced "by us and in us" ( a nobis et in nobis). On the basis of the principle that "to one formal concept one objective concept necessarily corresponds;" uni conceptui formali unus conceptus obiectivus necessario respondet, Suárez, as never before in Scholasticism, made extra-mental reality dependent for its truth on in intra-mental concept, thus changing the main thrust of medieval philosophy. Descartes adopted the same approach when faced with he basic problem of his system, of establishing, through the resources of the intellect, knowledge that was objectively certain. Like Suárez, he made an intra-mental concept the criterion for determining extra- mental reality. The intra-mental concept was the thinker's "cogito"; the extra-mental reality was the thinker's existence, "sum"; with the certainty of the existence following as a necessary consequence, " ergo", from the intra-mental concept itself.

Suárez could not have become the founder of modern philosophy before he had worked out his own system, the technical vocabulary of which provided the groundwork for the emerging modern systems. This vocabulary was first needed to systematize metaphysics. The long subjection to the unmethodical text of Aristotle had delayed the attainment of this important philosophical object, realised at last in the Disputationes Metaphysicae.

In the two volumes of that great work, the philosophy of being was given a binary structure, characterized, though not by its author, as general (vol. 1) and special (vol. 2) metaphysics. General metaphysics has as its theme the common concept of being, its general attributes, and its causes; and s pecial metaphysics, the kinds of being contained under the common concept, (*) classified in two dichotomies, the primary of finite and infinite, and the secondary of substance and accident. Suárez also furnished the burgeoning modern systems with vocabulary as groundwork for their ideas, in many cases the vocabulary anomalously grew to be alien to the system that was its source. How was this possible? Through that system undergoing anamorphosis, a condition where something distorted occasionally appears to be regular; indeed so regular, that the distorted ideas seem to belong to the nature of anamorphosed thing itself. Which may explain why the realist Suárez is made out to be a crypto-idealist, and it may be that the philosophies of realism (Scholasticism) and idealism (modern philosophies) have some hidden affinity and are closer together than one would suppose."

From: José Pereira, Suárez Between Scholasticism and Modernity, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007, pp. 27-28.

(*) Suárez describes general metaphysics and its "propriam et adaequatam rationem, ac deinde proprietates eius et causas." DM 2: 1, introductory paragraph [25: 64] "... de communi conceptu entis, illiusque proprietatibus, quae de illa reciproce dicuntur.' DM 28, introductory paragraph [26: 1]. He describes special metaphysics as "res omnes, quae sub ente continentur, et illius rationem includunt, et sub obiectiva ratione huius scientiae cadunt, et a materia in suo esse abstrahunt." DM 2: 1, introductory paragraph [25: 64] "... definitas rationes entium... divisiones varias ipsius entis et membrorum eius... primam et maxime essentialem divisionem entis in finitum et infinitum secundum essentiam seu in ratione entis." DM 28, introductory paragraph [26: 1].


"The two large folio volumes of the Disputationes metaphysicae appeared in Salamanca in 1597. In his brief foreword, "Ad lectorem," Suárez indicates his reason for undertaking this project: "It is impossible for anyone to become a competent theologian unless he builds upon a solid metaphysical foundation." He develops this view in the Prooemium or prologue to his work. The science of metaphysics, he holds, is indispensable for a mastery of theology. More intimately than any other human field of knowledge, it is connected with theology; it has for its object the most universal and supreme principles which embrace all being and are the foundation of all knowledge. This function of metaphysics was for Suárez a compelling motive for interrupting his theological labors and producing, in one systematic, comprehensive work, the results of his metaphysical studies and investigations, begun many years before. The prologue reads as follows :

"Sacred and supernatural theology relies on divine illumination and on principles revealed by God. However, it is cultivated by human reasoning and investigation, and therefore enlists the aid of truths naturally known, using them as ministers and instruments to develop its deductions and to illustrate divine truths. But of all the natural sciences, that which holds the primacy and has won the name of first philosophy is most valuable for promoting sacred and supernatural theology. For among them all it approaches most closely to the science of divine things, and also explains and vindicates those natural principles which embrace the universe of being and in one way or another stand at the basis of all learning.

For this reason I wished to revise and expand what I have worked out for my students and publicly taught on various occasions during many years concerning this natural wisdom, so that the results of my reflections might be made available to the general public. Accordingly I am forced for a time to interrupt, or rather to postpone, the more weighty commentaries and disputations on sacred theology I am so busily engaged in, as well as the taxing labor required for their publication.

"It often happened that while I was treating of divine mysteries, metaphysical problems would come up. Without a knowledge and understanding of these, the higher mysteries of Christianity can scarcely, if at all, be discussed as they deserve. Hence I had to mingle baser questions with supernatural subjects, a practice that is annoying to readers and is not very profitable for them; or else, to avoid this awkward procedure, I had briefly to propose my own opinion in such matters, and Its demand of toy readers a blind faith in my judgment. This was embarrassing for me, and could well seem out of place to them. Metaphysical principles and truths are so closely interwoven with theological conclusions and deductions, that if knowledge and full understanding of the former are lacking, knowledge of the latter must necessarily suffer.

"Led on by such considerations, I yielded to repeated requests and decided to write the present work. I have arranged all the metaphysical disputations according to a method calculated to combine comprehensive treatment with brevity, and so to be of greater service to revealed wisdom. Hence it will not be necessary to divide the work into several books. For all that pertains to this doctrine and is suitable to its subject matter in the light of the method adopted, can be fully handled in a limited number of disputations. What belongs to "pure philosophy" or dialectics has, so far as possible, been left out as not in keeping with the scope of the work. I shall adhere to this norm, even though I am aware that other writers on metaphysics devote much space to such subjects. But before I begin to treat of the subject-matter of this doctrine I shall, God willing, discuss wisdom or metaphysics itself, its object, use, necessity and its attributes and rewards."

The work falls into two main parts, coinciding with the two volumes in which it was published. It comprises fifty-four disputations in all. The first volume treats of metaphysics in its broadest comprehension: being as such, and the properties and causes of being. The first disputation deals with the object of metaphysics; the second inaugurates an exposition of the concept of being. Disputations III to XI discuss the passions and transcendental properties of being. Disputations XII to XXVII embody the author's doctrine on causes.

The second volume opens with a consideration of infinite and finite being. Two disputations deal with natural knowledge of the existence, nature, and attributes of God. The remaining disputations are devoted to the metaphysics of finite being, distributed according to the Aristotelian categories.

As the title indicates, the work is cast in the form of disputations. The discussions follow a regular pattern. First, the problem is stated. Then the various solutions that have actually been proposed by philosophers are reviewed ( Variae opiniones). Thirdly, Suárez gives what he considers to be the true doctrine or, as the case may be, the most probable theory ( Vera sententia or Resolutio quaestionis). A refutation of opposing views often brings the disputation to a close." pp. 6-7

From: Cyril Vollert, Introduction to: On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (Disputatio VII), Translated from the Latin with an introduction by Cyril Vollert, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947


I. The nature of metaphysics (1)

II. The transcendentals: being and its attributes (2-11)

A. Being (2, 3)

B. One (4, 5- 7)

C. True (8, 9)

D. Good (10, 11)

III. The causes of being (12-27)

A. Causes in general (12)

B. The material cause (13, 14)

C. The formal cause (15, 16)

D. The efficient cause (17-19, 20-22)

E. The final cause (23, 24)

F. The exemplar cause (25)

G. Relation of the causes to their effects and to each other (26, 27)

IV. The division of being into infinite and finite (28-31)

A. The distinction between infinite and finite being (28)

B. The existence and nature of the First Being (29, 30)

C. Finite being (31)

V. The division of finite being into substance and accident (32-38)

A. The distinction between substance and accident (32)

B. Created substance in general (33)

C. Primary substance (or suppositum) (34)

D. Immaterial substance (35)

E. Material substance (36)

F. Accidents in general (37, 38)

VI. The division of accidents into the nine categories (39-53)

A. The division of accidents into the nine highest genera (39)

B. Quantity (40, 41)

C. Quality (42-46)

D. Relation (47)

E. Action (48)

F. Passion (49)

G. Time (5o)

II. Place (51)

I. Position (52)

J. Having (53)

VII. Real being versus being of reason (54)

From: Alfred J. Freddoso, Introduction to: On Efficient Causality. Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19. New Haven: Yale University Press 1994, pp. XVI-XVII.


"In the twenty-seven Disputations which make up the first volume, Suárez is concerned with being in general while, symmetrically, in the twenty-seven Disputations of the second volume he descends to particular being -- in effect dividing metaphysics itself into a general and a special part.

In the very first Disputation ( Opera omnia, Paris: Vivès [1856]: vol. 25, pp. 1-64), he tells us that the object of metaphysics is "being insofar as it is real being." Explaining this, in Disputation 2 (pp. 64-102) he uses two distinctions already familiar to Scholastic authors. The first is between the formal concept as an act of the mind and the objective concept as what is immediately the object of that act. This latter may be an individual thing or some common feature (ratio) of things. It may, further, be something mind-independent, whether actual or possible, or it may be something merely objective or mind-dependent. The second distinction is between being as a participle, which refers to actual existents and being as a noun, which refers to whatever is not a simple fiction but is true in itself and apt really to exist. The object of metaphysics is then identified with the "common objective concept of being as a noun." This precise object, which reflects Avicenna's (980-1037) understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics, abstracts from existence and, as common, transcends all categories, genera, species and differences to embrace everything real. This last runs a range from extrinsic denominations (such as "being right," "being left," "being known," or "being willed"), 9 through mere possibles (which reduce to non-contradiction), to actual created substances and accidents, to the subsistent, purely actual, necessary, untreated, and infinite reality of God. Over this range, the common concept of being as a noun is analogous with what Suárez will call "an analogy of intrinsic attribution." In this analogy, a unified concept of being is shared, in an order that is intrinsic to it, by different beings (God and creatures, substance and accidents) in such way that the being of what is posterior depends upon and indeed "demands" (postulat) the being of what is prior.

Disputation 3 (pp. 102-115) offers a general treatment of the transcendental properties, namely unity, truth, and goodness, which belong to every being insofar as it is a being. " pp. XI-XII (notes omitted)

From: John P. Doyle, Introduction to: Francisco Suárez, T he Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations 28-29, South Bend: St. Augustine Press, 2004 pp. IX-XXIV.

"To what extent Suárez, despite his token references to Thomas Aquinas, follows Scotus' approach is evident from the definition of the subject matter of metaphysics in the first of the 54 disputations. Here he discusses six possible solutions to the problem, but dismisses all of them as either too comprehensive or too restrictive. The subject matter of metaphysics is neither everything that is knowable nor the "supreme real being" (Suárez, Disp. Met. 1.1.9), i.e. God or the immaterial being; nor is it the finite being that is the subject matter of physics. Rather, the subject matter of metaphysics is "being as such" ( ens inquantum ens), i.e. a common determination (ibid. 1.1.23 and 26) that is grasped in a concept that abstracts from all categorial determinations as well as from being finite/infinite, being caused/uncaused, and being material/immaterial. Metaphysics is, therefore, the "most general science" (ibid. 1.5.14), because it treats of the " rationes universales transcendentales" (ibid. 1.2.27). That is to say, metaphysics is a scientia transcendens in the Scotistic sense. Because the immaterial being (God) cannot be known except through previously known transcategorial attributes of being, metaphysics as transcendental science and metaphysics as theology coincide.

According to Suárez, metaphysics deals with the "formal" as well as the "objective" concept of being. By the formal concept of being, Suárez understands the act of knowing, which " ex unica et prima impositione" (ibid. 2.2.24) yields an intentional representation of the object; by the objective concept he designates that which is intentionally represented by that act. In other words, Suárez does not assume a theory of concepts characterized by a noetic-noematic parallelism of res and conceptus; rather he accepts Ockham's critical approach towards a strictly realistic interpretation of universal concepts. Since Scotus himself does not rely on that parallelism when it comes to the concept of being, Suárez can substantially follow Scotus and apply 'being' to a first and unified formal concept which, in virtue of its imposition, represents a first and unified objective concept of absolutely simple content that grasps all different beings in an indeterminate way, i.e. as being.

To the formal concept of being there corresponds an appropriate and immediate objective concept, which is explicitly neither substance nor accident, neither God nor creature, but which designates these in a unified way, i.e. inasmuch as they are similar and agree in being. (ibid. 2.2.8)

What does the objective concept that corresponds to the formal concept of being mean? According to Suárez, it is a determination that transcends the generality of the genus; this determination cannot be defined, but only explicated through its relationship to actual existence. 'Being' means "that which can exist" ( id quod aptum est esse seu realiter existere: ibid. 2.4.7); the possibility of existence is grounded in an ontological disposition which (as we have seen before) appears in the non-contradiction of the internal contents constituting essences.

Because entity in the sense of being(ness) -- which in a concrete being is identical with the entity or being(ness) of that being -- is grasped indeterminately by the concept of being, that concept has an "illimitability and transcendence" (ibid.2.6.10) on account of which it precedes all more determinate modes. First among those more determinate modes, according to both Suárez and Scotus, is the classification "finite/infinite", which Suárez understands in terms of "intensity"; this allows him to interpret finite being as a non-determinate mode of an intensive quantity and infinite being as the "totally indivisible infinity of perfection which in itself is most real and complete" (ibid. 30.2.25)." pp. 62-63.

From: Ludger Honnefelder, Metaphysics as a Discipline: from the "Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients" to "Kant's Notion of Transcendental Philosophy". In The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700. Edited by Friedman Russell L. and Nielsen Lauge Olaf. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003. pp. 53-74.


"As every historian of philosophy knows, Aristotle thought the subject of metaphysics was "being insofar as it is being" and from this subject he excluded "being as true". Centuries after Aristotle, Francisco Suárez, S.J., designated the subject of metaphysics more explicitly as "being insofar as it is real being".

The addition of "real" to Aristotle's formula highlighted the inclusion of all that can as well as does exist (4). Against the backdrop of two already well known distinctions - (1) between formal and objective concepts, and (2) between being as a participle and being as a noun -- for Suárez the subject so conceived was identical with "the objective concept of being as a noun" (5). Concurrently, while being was said to be analogous with regard to hierarchically ordered objects (God and creatures, substance and accidents) with an intrinsic attribution of the perfection it represented (6), such analogy presupposed a common, unitary, and all but univocal, concept (7). But from that concept and from the subject of metaphysics Suárez excluded "beings of reason" (8), which he subsumed under Aristotle's being as true (9), and of which impossible objects, in the sense of those that would be self-contradictory, furnished the paradigm case. (10)" pp. 297-298

(4) DM 2, 4, n. 3 (XXV, 88).

(5) Cf. DM 2, s. 4, n. 3 (XXV, p. 88). For the distinction between formal and objective concepts in writings available to Suárez, cf. Thomas de Vio, Cardinalis Caietanus, In "De ente et essentia", c. 1, qu. 2, ed. P. Laurent. Taurini, Marietti, 1934, pp. 25-28, and Pedro da Fonseca, S.J., In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros, L. IV, c. 2, q. 2. ed. Coloniae, Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1615, I, pp. 710-11. On being as a noun in contrast to being as a participle, see e.g. P. Fonseca, In Met. Arist., L. IV, ch. 2, qu. 2, s. 2 (I, p. 740). Also see the texts of Duns Scotus (1265-1308) given by M. Fernandez Garcia, O.F.M., Lexicon Scholasticum. Quaracchi, Ex Typographia Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1910, p. 241. We may note that Scotus in one of the texts cited by Fernandez Garcia refers to the distinction as "antique": "Solet antiquitus dici, quod ens potest esse participium, vel nomen", Opus prim. super I Periherm., q. 8, n. 10. Before Scotus, cf. St. Thomas, Quodlib. II, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Spiazzi. Taurini, Marietti, 1956, p. 24.

(6) Cf. DM 28, s. 3 (XXVI, p. 13); ibid., d. 32, sec. 2 (XXVI, p. 319); ibid., d. 2,

s. 2, n. 14 (XXV, pp. 69-70); ibid., d. 12, s. 1, nn. 13-24 (pp. 378-82); also see his treatment of the analogous notion of "cause", ibid., d. 27, s. 1, nn. 9-11 (p. 952).

(7) Cf. DM 2, s. 2, n. 36 (XXV, p. 81).

(8) DM 1, s. 1, n. 6 (XXV, p. 4); ibid., n. 26 (p. 11); ibid., d. 4, s. 8, n. 4 (p. 138); ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 3 (XXVI, p. 794); and ibid., d. 54, prol. 1 (p. 1014).

(9) Cf. DM 54, s. 1, n. 4 (XXVI, p. 1016) where he is speaking about beings of reason in general; cf. ibid., s. 3, n. 1 (p. 1026); and ibid., s. 5, n. 16 (p. 1035), where he is immediately speaking about true statements regarding chimerae.

(10) On this, see my article, " Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth ( I )", in Vivarium, XXV, 1 (1987), esp. pp. 69-75. For Suárez's overall teaching on "beings of reason", cf. DM 54, De Entibus Rationis (XXVI, pp. 1014-41). For an English version, cf. Francisco Suárez, S.J.: On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis Metaphysical Disputation LIV, translated with introduction and notes by J. P. Doyle, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1995. On impossible objects after Suárez see my article, " Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A Seventeen Century Debate about Impossible Objects", in The Review of Metaphysics, XLVIII (1995), pp. 771-808.

From: John P. Doyle, Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy. In Meeting of the Minds. The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy. Edited by Brown Stephen F. Turnhout: Brepols 1998, pp. 297-315.


"Heidegger reserves the place of honor in his exposition [ of the Thesis of Medieval Ontology] for the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), a figure whose pre-eminence for Heidegger is both systematic and historical. Suárez is the bridge between the Middle Ages and the modern world ( Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie 111-16/ English translation 79-83). It was through Suárez that the metaphysics of Scholasticism flowed into modern thinkers; his influence is clearly detectable in Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Schopenhauer, Kant, and Hegel. Suárez abandoned the format of the commentarium employed by the classical Scholastic thinkers and developed instead a strictly philosophical and systematic treatise entitled Disputationes metaphysicae. Although it was written in the seventeenth century, it is the first major systematic Scholastic treatise on metaphysics (GP 112/80). St. Thomas' major works, for example, are either commentaries or, when they are systematic, theological treatises. The Disputationes is divided into fifty-four tracts. The first twenty-seven treat of metaphysica generalis (or ontologia); the next twenty-six treat of special beings ( metaphysica specialis); the fifty-fourth is devoted to beings of reason ( entia rationis). In general metaphysics Suárez investigates the properties of the abstract concept of being in general. In special metaphysics, he investigates God and creatures, that is, infinite and finite beings. This distinction between general and special metaphysics was imported fully intact by Wolff and made its way to the center of Kant's architectonic -- to the distinction between the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic -- in the Critique of Pure Reason."

From: John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas. An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, New York: Fordham University Press, 1982, p. 69.

"The first Disputatio treats: De natura primae philosophiae seu metaphysicae, of the essence of First Philosophy or metaphysics. Suárez begins in the introduction (3) by discussing the various designations of metaphysics ( varia metaphysicae nomina), and does so with independent recourse to Aristotle. Here he finds that metaphysics is designated as sapientia ( sophia), prudentia ( phronesis), then as prima philosophia ( proté philosophia), then as naturalis theologia( theologiké) -- which Suárez here interprets in a sense quite unlike that of antiquity ( quoniam de Deo ac divinis rebus sermonem habet, quantum ex naturali lumine haberi potest 4) – and finally as metaphysica.

Suárez says that this natural theology or First Philosophy is called metaphysics because it deals with God (ex quo etiam metaphysica nominata est 5). He thereby gives the expression a different meaning from that of Aquinas. Aquinas uses the expression metaphysica insofar as it treats de ente in communi. Suárez, on the other hand, says it is called metaphysics because it is theology. He remarks that this title 'metaphysics' does not stem from Aristotle himself, but from his interpreters ( quod nomen non tam ab Aristotele, quam ab ejus interpretibus habuit 6). However, he is of the opinion that Aristotle did put together this collection.

He explains the expression 'metaphysics' in a sense that deviates from the explanation given by Aquinas, and brings in another point of view which is significant in the history of metaphysics: de his rebus, quae scientias seu res naturales consequuntur. (7) (...)

The Metaphysics is not concerned, then, with such books as come after those about physics, rather 'coming after' is now taken in the sense of content: knowledge of the suprasensuous is later than that of the sensuous. In the order of appropriation, in the order in which knowledge of the suprasensuous arises, in the sequence of investigation, metaphysical knowledge is placed after knowledge of physics. Suárez stresses the méta in the sense of post and understands this post in the sense of the stages of knowledge proceeding from the sensuous to the suprasensuous. At the same time however he brings into play the interpretation in terms of content: méta, afterwards, that which comes afterwards, which exceeds the sensuous."

From: Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude,Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 52-53.

(3) Suárez, Disputatones Metaphysicae. Disp I Opera Omnia Ed. C. Berton (Paris, 156ff.) vol. 25 pp. 1 ff.

(4) ibid.

(5) ibid.

(6) ibid.

(7) ibid.

"Suárez is the thinker who had the strongest influence on modem philosophy. Descartes is directly dependent on him, using his terminology almost everywhere. It is Suárez who for the first time systematized medieval philosophy and above all ontology. Before him the Middle Ages, including Thomas and Duns Scotus, treated ancient thought only in commentaries, which deal with the texts seriatim. The basic book of antiquity, Aristotle's Metaphysics, is not a coherent work, being without a systematic structure. Suárez saw this and tried to make up for this lack, as he regarded it, by putting the ontological problems into a systematic form for the first time, a form which determined a classification of metaphysics that lasted through the subsequent centuries down to Hegel.

In accordance with Suárez' scheme, distinctions were drawn between metaphysica generalis, general ontology, and metaphysica specialis, which included cosmologia rationalis, ontology of nature, psychologia, ontology of mind, and theologia rationalis, ontology of God. This arrangement of the central philosophical disciplines recurs in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Transcendental logic corresponds in its foundations to general ontology. What Kant deals with in transcendental dialectic, the problems of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology, corresponds to what modern philosophy recognized as questions. Suárez, who gave an exposition of his philosophy in the Disputationes metaphysicae (1597), not only exercised great influence on the further development of theology within Catholicism but, with his order colleague Fonseca, had a powerful effect on the shaping of Protestant Scholasticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their thoroughness and philosophical level are higher by far than that which Melanchthon, for example, attained in his commentaries on Aristotle."

From: Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,Translation, introduction, and lexicon by Albert Hofstadter. Revised edition, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 80 (Lecture course given at the University of Marburg in the summer of 1927).



Shields, Christopher and Schwartz, Daniel, "Francisco Suárez", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

Scholasticon by Jacob Schmutz: the best resource on the Second Scholasticism (in French).

Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) by Sydney Penner: with the Latin texts and some unpublished translations.

The Latin text of the Disputationes Metaphysicae,De anima and of the commentary to De Generatione et Corruptione(*) are available on the site of Prof. Salvador Castellote.

(*) The first edition of this work is published in: Jacob Schmutz (ed.), Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez, De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote, Valencia, Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer, 2004, pp. 433-682).





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